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Abstract 
Attachment theory has long considered the ways in which our close relationships serve as a 
source of security. Psychologists have recently begun to recognize that people als  d rive similar 
feelings of security from other sources. This paper builds on this work by showing that people 
turn to material objects as a source of security, specifically when threatened with reminders that 
close others are unreliable. In two studies, we find strong empirical support for this p ed ction, 
suggesting that reminders of the unreliability of close others leads people to report greater 
attachment to objects (Study 1) and that this effect is mediated specifically by n increase in 
attachment anxiety, or concern that close others will not be sufficient to meet one’s security 
needs (Study 2). 
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 Close others offer a number of important benefits for an individual. We might find that a
new significant other offers new means of exploring our local environment (by, e.g., introducing 
one into new social networks), provides us with the opportunity to receive compliments from 
others, and changes the ways we think about ourselves, etc.  These benefits are not, however, 
limited to our relationships with people. For example, a new car gives us new means to explore 
our local environment, provides us with the opportunity to receive compliments from others, and 
may even give us new constructive ways of thinking about our identity (Dittmar, 1992; Dittmar, 
2004). 
 One of the most well-researched and central features of our relationships wit  close 
others is attachment (for review see Cassidy, 2008). Specifically, humans are believed to have an 
innate system that leads us to seek out close others as a source of security, i.e., protection from 
dangers in the physical and social world as well as from threatening intrapsychic tates such as 
negative feelings of uncertainty or anxiety. While it is presumed that our relationships to other 
people serve as a primary source of an individual’s sense of safety and belonging, the goal of this 
thesis is to investigate the ways in which people might use objects to supplement the security 
provided by relationships. 
 In particular, the goal of this project is to provide evidence that when people are faced 
with concerns about close others’ reliability, they will be motivated to compensat  for that threat 
by strengthening their attachment relations with material objects. Thi  hypothesis is novel in that 
it does not seem intuitive that people would invest in their relationship with inanimate objects as 
a source of care, warmth, and connectedness. The following sections explain how this hypothesis 
does indeed follow from an understanding of the versatility of the human attachment syst m. 
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Afterward, I assess this hypothesis in two experiments testing the effect o  increasing the 
salience of close others’ unreliability on attachment to material objects.  
Attachment: The Innate Need for Security 
 Attachment theory, developed by Bowlby (1958), maintains that humans have an innate 
psychological system that leads us to derive security from relationships. Bowlby bserved that 
children who had been forcibly isolated from their parents due to political upheaval showed 
pronounced levels of anxiety and despair (1969/1982). Drawing on evolutionary theory as well 
as psychoanalytic theory, Bowlby proposed that children had an innate attachment syst m 
designed to keep them in close proximity to their caregivers. Because infants are profoundly 
dependent on others for their survival, those motivated to seek out and remain close to their 
caregivers tended to receive the food, comfort, and protection from hazards necessary to urvive 
and procreate, whereas those who were not motivated to maintain proximity to caregivers had 
less reproductive success. Because of this innate attachment system, individuals experience 
distress when they are separated from their caregivers.  
 The security provided by the attachment system is intended to be quite broad. In terms of 
physical security, Bowlby’s suggestion is that the attachment system i designed to ensure 
continued survival for the infant (and hence also for the caregiver’s genes). Th  attachment 
system also serves to facilitate psychological security, which is less directly instrumental for 
survival. Psychological security includes the relief of negative affective s ates (e.g. anxiety, 
uncertainty) and feelings of social support. The attachment system includes a thr at-detector that 
responds to physical or psychological threats by activating proximity-seeking behaviors oriented 
toward gaining and maintaining security (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2008).  
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 The attachment system leads humans to develop particular kinds of relationships with 
others, namely attachment relations (or attachment bonds) which are distinct from other non-
security providing kinds of relationships that people have with others. Ainsworth (1989), a 
student of Bowlby’s, claims that attachment bonds are a specific type of affectional bond. 
Affectional bonds are: 1) persistent, 2) involve a specific target, 3) are emotionally significant, 4) 
marked by a motivation to be with the target, and 5) cause distress at involuntary separation from 
the target (summarized in Cassidy, 2008)1. In addition to these criteria, attachment bonds are 
unique in that they add a sixth essential feature: the individual seeks security and comfort in their 
relationship with the target (Ainsworth, 1989). The essence of attachment relations is that they 
provide security, physical or psychological. 
  While Bowlby and Ainsworth originally emphasized of the role of the attachment system 
in children, contemporary social psychological literature reveals that the tachment system 
shapes people’s social relationships over the course of the life-span (see, e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 
1987). In adolescence, as children begin to develop autonomy, the attachment system diversifies 
considerably (for a review, see Allen, 2008). In particular, people move from isolated attachment 
relations with caregivers to more complex strategies in which some peer relationships serve key 
attachment functions. For example, some friends might become important for emotional 
consolation, while other friends may help to encourage one to pursue novel tasks. In both cases, 
friends offer psychological security, but in one case in the form of reassurance and in the other 
case as a so-called “secure base,” facilitating exploratory behaviors by reassuring the subject. 
Eventually, the attachment system becomes important to forming and maintaining romantic 
relationships (Feeney, 2008; Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Pair bonds in adulthood ensure that 
individuals have an attachment figure who consistently provides comfort and reassurance.  
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 Taken as a whole, research demonstrating the diverse ways in which the attac ment 
system shapes friendships and romantic relationships in adulthood suggests that the att chment 
system is versatile. Indeed, the system is so versatile that it has been proposed to underlie 
people’s relationships with supernatural agents (Kirkpatrick, 2005). While an attachment relation 
to a divine figure could never provide actual physical security (e.g. providing food), religious 
beliefs can bolster the perceived symbolic proximity to a powerful agent who can provide safety 
and personal validation in the face of everyday anxieties and risks (Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 
2008).  For example, research has shown that when children are asked about the perceived 
closeness of a divine figure, they see a god as “closer” spiritually when the attachment system is 
activated (by priming thoughts of death, illness, and pain; Granqvist, Ljungdahl, & Dickie, 
2007). Just as children are motivated to be physically close to caregivers when faced with threat, 
we also observe that the attachment system leads them to be symbolically close to a divine figure 
in the same way. 
 Interestingly, there is some empirical evidence to support the claim that at achment to a 
divine figure serves as a compensation for a lack of interpersonal attachment (for review see 
Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008).  In a sample of Swedish undergraduates, participants who are 
single (as opposed to those in relationships) reported significantly higher levels of r ligious 
activity, closer relationships with a god, and more emotional religiosity, even after controlling for 
attachment style (Granqvist & Hagekull, 2000). The researchers suggest that this difference is the 
result of a compensatory strategy: when people have insufficient attachment to close others, they 
invest more into attachment with a god. In a comprehensive meta-analysis of research on 
attachment and religion, it was noted that people who report sudden religious conversions are 
less secure in their interpersonal attachments (Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2004). The researchers 
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suggest that people who lack stable attachment relations with close others may strongly invest in 
a religion as a means of compensating for a lack of interpersonal attachment. 
 If people learn to use non-human targets such as a god to compensate for a lack of human 
attachment, might people also turn to their material possessions, such as cars or computers, to 
satisfy their attachment needs? In other words, might people also derive a sense of security from 
their relationships with their material possessions? From an evolutionary perspective, it seems 
that the benefits of the attachment system are really only realizable to the extent that the 
attachment figure is human and can actually provide physical protection and emotional care. 
However, research on the role of attachment in religiosity suggests that people often find security 
in non-human attachment figures and that this can allow people to compensate for a lack of 
human attachment. Of course, it is commonly assumed that divine figures are subjects, with at 
least some relevant features for interpersonal attachment relationships (e.g., compassion).  
 It remains an open question, therefore, as to whether people increase their attachmen  to 
objects as a means of compensating for a lack of reliable security from close others. Before 
turning to the research, I would like to briefly review research on the ways in which our 
relationships with objects meet the key features of attachment relationships, as noted by 
attachment theory, so as to provide a theoretical rationale for the central hypothesis that people 
will compensate for threats to interpersonal attachment by strengthening object attachment. In 
particular, it would seem to be more likely that people would turn to their objects as 
compensatory security sources if one’s relationships to objects met Ainsworth’  (1989) 
aforementioned criteria for an attachment bond. In the following sections I examine each 
criterion and review theory and evidence suggesting that object relationships can indeed satisfy 
it.  
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Persistence in Object Relationships 
 Ainsworth has suggested that attachment relationships are persistent: the role of an 
attachment figure is fairly stable across time. Relying on someone to get hrough one stressful 
situation is not sufficient to indicate an attachment relationship. In the case of some central 
attachment figures (e.g., a mother or father), the attachment relation c n literally span decades of 
a person’s life, and serve as a stable source of security throughout the comings and goings of 
more transient relationships. Research has shown, for example, that activating houghts of a 
parent can reduce the defensiveness people usually show in response to reminders of their 
mortality (Cox et al., 2008) 
 Do people have such persistent relations with objects? Arguably, people are under 
immense pressures to have very short-term or disposable relations with objects, as consumerism 
motivates people to dispose old objects in search of newer fashions and models. 
 Collectors, however, demonstrate that people can and do have long-term relationships 
with their objects. Collection, unlike many other forms of consumption, is marked by its 
persistence: the usefulness of collected objects is their extended possession (Belk, 1995; 
McIntosh & Schmeichel, 2004). Unlike other more common modes of consumption, such as 
single-use commodities (e.g., food from a restaurant) or access consumption (pay ng for the 
experience, but non-possession, of a commodity, e.g., an art exhibit or film; Chen, 2009), 
collecting requires developing both a long-term and personal relationship wit the objects in 
one’s collection. 
  In interviews with over 200 participants, Belk (1995) has attempted to systematically 
classify the behaviors and motivations of self-identifying collectors. Collectors commonly see 
their collecting behavior as essential to preserving personal or collective memory: a collection of 
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beer cans is more than just an accumulation of metal cylinders, but rather a testament to the 
development of a particular consumer culture. Collections can only serve this role to the extent 
that the collector can maintain their role as “curator” in collecting and maintaini g the objects of 
a collection. 
 It is not unusual for people’s long-term relationships with objects or collecti ns to offer 
people a sense of value. Collectors are willing to make sacrifices to maintain and expand their 
collections that are every bit as extreme as the sacrifices people make to main ain their 
interpersonal relationships.   
The Significance of Object Relationships 
 Another essential feature of attachment relationships is their emotional sig ificance: 
attachment relationships are central to defining our identity throughout the lifespan. It is this 
emotional centrality that leads, for example, to the unique forms of grief that people experience 
after the loss of an attachment figure (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2008; Shaver & Fraley, 2008). The 
typical strategies of the attachment system, such as proximity seeking and maintenance, become 
permanently frustrated by the realization of the loss of the attachment figure. 
 Do people have such emotionally significant relationships to objects? The research on 
collection, discussed above, provides mixed findings on this point. Collection provides people 
with a clear sense of their identity, with clear standards of self-worth (having a more complete 
collection), and feelings of control (Belk, 1995). While collectors do value their collecti ns, it is 
typically the case that the value of a collection is derivative or extrinsic: collections are often 
valuable to collectors because of the recognition and support that collectors receive from the 
community of fellow collectors (Belk, 1995).  
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 One might even make the case that objects have very little intrinsic emotional 
significance at all. In their research on the meaning of belongings, Czikzentmihalyi & Rochberg-
Halton (1981) interviewed hundreds of households in the Chicago area and consistently found 
that the meanings people imbue to their objects derive from the interpersonal relationships that 
those objects signify. For example, a person may cherish her dinner table because her family 
gathered there. 
 In contrast to these findings, a long tradition in psychological theorizing sugge ts that at 
least some objects have intrinsic emotional significance. James (1890) was an e rly proponent of 
the idea that objects in our environment play a valuable role in constituting the material self, that 
is, the self as it is physically manifested in the world. This material self is constituted by not only 
possessions, but also family members who are “bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh,” and te
home itself. While we already know that family members can be emotionally significant, James’s 
inclusion of inanimate objects in the material self suggests the possibility that people’s normal 
relations with objects can carry their own emotional significance. James lludes to this 
possibility when he says that, relative to our urge to affiliate with others, “an equally instinctive 
impulse drives us to collect property; and the collections thus made become, with different 
degrees of intimacy, parts of our empirical selves” (James, 1890). In support of this claim, James 
points out the sense of loss and harm that people experience when they lose their property.  
Converging with James, many philosophers have considered how people incorporate 
objects into the self. For example, Husserl’s (1913/1999) phenomenological approach to identity 
suggests that the boundary of the self is determined by the boundary of one’s efficacy. While 
other subjects may not do what we expect, some objects (e.g., tools, guitars, tennis rackets)
respond directly to the ego’s commands and thus can, temporarily, become a part of the self. For 
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the skilled tennis player or the carpenter, an object is, literally, integrated into the active self (for 
a modern restatement and development of this position see, Gallagher, 2005). At the level of 
psychological action, extended mind theory (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) suggests that ment l 
processes are functionally scaffolded by objects: an individual’s memory, as a functional system 
for storing and retrieving information, includes not only neurons, but also cameras, checkbooks, 
Facebook pages, and even other people.  
This inclusion of useful objects into the physical or psychological self has been supported 
by sociological theory on the relationship between identity and evocative objects, or objects that 
make possible our actions and thoughts (Turkle, 2007). Turkle’s research on people’s narratives 
of object use suggests that people often recognize the ways in which objects make their current 
identity possible. A synthesizer can create the possibility for creative expression and musical 
exploration, a new car can make possible a sense of autonomy and create the material conditions 
for taking control over one’s situation (by coming and going when and where one pleases). 
Understanding who we are requires, at least in part, understanding the objects we’ve used to 
become who we are. 
 Building on James, we can say that not only is our embodied self in part constituted by 
objects (when, e.g. we swing a hammer), but objects also serve to constitute our social self, or 
our identity as constructed by relations to others (James, 1890). Dittmar’s research on the 
relationship between identity and material objects has provided strong support for this claim. In 
early studies on the emotional significance of material possessions, Dittmar asked participants to 
name their five most valued possessions and to justify their selections (1991). One important 
function of these valued commodities is to give us new social groups with which to identify (e.g. 
BMW owners, people who like crunchy peanut butter) (Dittmar, 1994; Dittmar, 2004). 
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Commodities (e.g. bumper stickers, sloganed t-shirts, etc.) can also communicate our 
membership in social groups, serve as reminders of our political ideals, demonstrate our relative 
social wealth, etc.  
 To summarize, converging lines of theory across diverse academic disciplines suggest 
that objects play a valuable role in determining how people think about their identities. This 
insight is consistent with the notion that objects have intrinsic emotional significance. In other 
words, things are not useful or valuable to us merely because they represent or signify social 
relationships. In addition to any social recognition, the possession of a collection of objects 
represents the accumulated time and effort that the self has expended in collecting goods. Such 
objects can become a part of our very physical and social identities, becoming as integral to 
understanding ourselves as our relationships.  
Specificity in Object Relationships 
 So far we have established that objects can be the targets of long-term and emotionally 
significant relationships. But what are we to make of the requirement of speci icity? The child's 
attachment to a mother is not an attachment to mothers or women generally, but to a very 
specific person who provides security. Turning to material objects, it seems that our instrumental 
relationships are often quite general. When getting a drink, we may need a cup to reach our goal, 
but not any particular cup. Do we have relationships to objects that are as specific as human 
attachment relations? 
 The research on object use considered so far provides no clear answer on this point. For 
the collector attempting to complete a collection, there both is and is not specificity. For 
example, if someone were trying to collect the entire series of original X-Men comics, and had 
all but #3, they would be motivated to find that particular comic, but this object is multiply 
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instantiated: there are hundreds of copies of this comic and any one would complete the 
collection. Likewise, with regard to the emotionally significant role of objects in constituting the 
self, people understand themselves as owners of a certain type of commodity. For example, 
understanding oneself as a person who owns/drives a BMW requires the application of  certain 
object-related stereotype to perceive the self (Dittmar, 1994). For this stereotype to be a 
stereotype in the first place, what is true of a particular BMW-owner must be true of all BMW 
owners. In other words, there is nothing specific about the particular car that a person owns that 
makes them a BMW owner, beyond the brand of the car itself (and any particular BMW would 
suffice to indicate membership). 
 However, not all of our interactions with objects are subject to the same level of 
fungibility. Psychoanalysts (and parents) have long noted the intense emotional atachments that 
children make to particular objects (e.g., blankets, stuffed animals, pacifiers). Winnicott 
(1953/1986) argued that certain objects become ‘transitional objects,’ meaning that one’s 
relationship to them provides the developing individual with an opportunity to begin constructing 
an understanding of how one can and should relate to the environment, including, ultimately, the 
social environment. Transitional objects are said to be transitional to the extent that they are 
experienced as both idealized and subjective while still being actual and objective. Recognizing 
that some things we experience are internal (e.g. feelings, memories) and others are external (e.g. 
objects, other people) is a developmental accomplishment made possible by these object . 
Transitional objects, unlike other things in the environment, are under the complete control of the 
child’s ego while still being tangible things.  This is the essential featur  of transitional objects: 
they reliably respond to the whims of the child and are there for the child whenever their 
presence is needed.  
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 From the perspective of psychological security, transitional objects are important because 
children use these objects as a way of self-soothing. The transitional object, like a blanket or 
teddy bear, offers the child a way of comforting themselves in the face of separation anxiety. In 
many ways, the choice of transitional object is designed for this purpose: transitional objects are 
often cuddled and are typically things that provide warmth, move, or “do something that seems 
to show it (the transitional object) has vitality or reality of its own” (Winnicott, 1953/1986, p. 
259). The transitional object is strategically selected for its ability to approximate the caregiver in 
a way that the ego can control: transitional objects provide a source of security that s external 
but reliable in a way that caregivers cannot be. This creates the possibility of breaking the 
continuity between the personal ego and the caregiver: the child’s ego learns to p ovide its own 
comfort with the tools (e.g. blankets) available to it. By creating the recogniti n of the distinction 
between subject and world, the transitional object creates the possibility of autonomy2. 
 There is in fact good reason to believe that transitional objects are important across the 
lifespan. Therapists drawing on Winnicott have noted that transitional phenomena (e.g., 
uncertainty about the objectivity of perceptions) remain a prominent feature of the anxieties and 
frustrations that clients face (Kahne, 1967). While it eventually becomes unwieldy to carry 
around teddy bears and blankets, researchers have suggested that even in adults, transitional 
objects are not uncommon and may play a significant role in helping the person cope with 
distress (Bachar et al., 1998). In a correlational study of Israeli adolescents, Bachar and 
colleagues (1998) found that those participants who report higher levels of anxiety, hostility, 
depression, and other negative mental health outcomes on a Brief Symptom Inventory (from 
Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983) were more likely to report having an object that hey used 
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specifically to cope with stressful events or sadness (a transitional object) than participants who 
scored low on those outcomes.  
 Follow-up research has further validated that adolescents’ use of a transitional object 
significantly correlates with depressive symptoms. Erkolahti and Nyström (2007) argue that 
adolescents who regress to transitional objects as a form of self-soothing do so to compensate for 
a lack of interpersonal attachment. People who find themselves increasingly without the 
resources to cope with depressive symptoms or anxiety fall back on more controllable rel tions 
with a transitional object to find security.  Boys who are extremely avoidant in fact show better 
therapeutic outcomes when they are asked to use teddy bears to speak in a group therapy session 
(Dockar-Drysdale, 1990). While self-disclosure or other interpersonal sources of s curity may be 
threatening, the use of a transitional object, while non-normative, can provide a source of 
security and comfort for young adults who otherwise lack a human source of security3. 
 While the research on collection and the relationship between possessions and identity 
offers no direct support for the specificity of our relationships to objects, the transitional object 
literature does. The transitional object is, by its very nature, non-fungible: only one fetishized 
object, namely the object under complete control of the ego, can effectively occupy the 
transitional space between subject and world. This research on the role of transition l objects in 
later life, as well as people’s practical investments in particular cars, books, guitars, etc. suggest 
that people do have very specific relationships with objects. Again, not unlike our need to b 
with particular close others, our attachment to objects can lead us to want to drink coffee out of 
that mug or to wear that lucky shirt. The question of whether or not this is an attachment relation 
will be passed over for the sake of this paper, though its theoretical import should be noted. 
Attachment Figures Need not be Subjects  
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 The research on transitional objects, besides illuminating the surprising specificity of 
some relationships with objects, critically highlights the ways in which objects can provide 
psychological security. To return to the question at hand: can objects serve as viable attachment 
figures? Are people actually motivated to find security through their material possessions? 
Transitional object phenomena, while only studied in limited samples (i.e., children, aolescents, 
and case studies of adults), suggests at least a tentative yes.   
 Clinical work on hoarding behavior provides further evidence to suggest that people find 
security and solace in their belongings. Valuable insights come from qualitative nterviews 
conducted with functional hoarders, people who self-identify as hoarders but are not diagsed 
with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) or any other mental disorder (Ch rier & Ponnor, 
2010). The motivations that functional hoarders cite importantly include concerns for security. 
Having a stockpile of anything from canned food to bicycle parts allows the hoarder to fe l that 
they have the material resources to cope with an uncertain future. 
 Economists consider hoarding behavior a non-normative or extreme form of risk 
minimization, a common prevention-focused strategy of consumption (McKinnon et al., 1985). 
For example, consumers often purchase every day goods, such as surge protectors, home security 
devices, or condoms, for risk-minimizing reasons. Hoarding is, in essence, the extreme of this 
fairly common strategy of stockpiling goods to reduce the threat of future risk or loss (McKinnon 
et al., 1985). For hoarders, as well as for normal consumers, accumulating possession  is a 
normal way of promoting physical and psychological security. 
 This motive for personal security or risk minimization that promotes hoarding is 
indicative of broader concerns about one’s ability to personally confront the futur (Frost et al., 
2007). In a sample of undergraduates, Frost and colleagues found that more self-doubt correlated 
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with greater interest in compulsive acquisition and materialism. Fitting w th the work on 
hoarding, this research supports the claim that a fear of one’s one abilities to cope with the world, 
or its future, ultimately leads people to acquire, stockpile, and hoard material goods to reassure 
themselves of their ability to face an uncertain future. 
 Finally, ethnographic research on the significance of the home has suggested that the 
mere presence of one’s personal belongings can be a source of comfort, even when not in the 
face of imminent uncertainty (Miller, 2008). Miller conducted interviews and observations in a 
number of households in a residential area of London. While many of his findings support claims 
found in earlier ethnography, including the role of relationships in providing objects with 
meaning (Czisksentmihalhi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981), the novelty of Miller’s approach is to 
chart the ways in which particular objects come to provide meaning and security for their 
owners.  Certain objects, such as holiday decorations, impose a meaningful structre o people’s 
life narratives: their presence frames the memories people use to understand their lives. To 
understand a person’s life history requires, in part, interrogating the history of their possessions: 
the story of Christmas celebrations is framed in terms of gifts given, ornaments acquired, mugs 
chipped, etc. As a result of this role, the very presence of these objects can provide a powerful 
sense of reassurance in the quality of one’s own life (or of its lack thereof) by prompting certain 
narrative framings of one’s past.  Having a book from a valued friend can provide a reminder that 
one has been supported, that one is loved, and that one is generally safe in the world.  
 To summarize, people do use their objects as a source of security and people seem to 
have attachment relations with material objects. The criteria for an attachment relation can be 
satisfied by material objects (persistence, emotional significance, specificity), including the most 
central feature, that people are motivated to find security through the attachment figure. While 
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the attachment system may have evolved to protect children from dangers in the environment, 
the versatility of the system has allowed people to find new sources of security in contemporary 
culture (more will be said about this in the discussion). The failure of attachment res archers to 
consider the security providing role of material possessions is an oversight that this paper is 
intended to begin the process of correcting. 
The Current Research: Attachment to Objects as a Compensatory Strategy 
 We have established that people can have genuine attachment relations to objects, but 
why would they do so? Given that our first and most central attachments are to caregivers, what 
factors would lead people to attach to objects? Taking a page from the research on attachment to 
a god (Granqvist & Hagekull, 2000), I propose that people attach to objects as a way of 
compensating for a lack of interpersonal attachment.  
 Some of the lines of research reviewed above provide indirect evidence that people 
strengthen their attachment bonds to objects in response to a threat to their interpersonal 
attachment. The transitional object research with adolescents provides support for this claim: 
those who cannot find security through close others turn to transitional objects as a way of 
coping with distress (Erkolahti & Nyström, 2007). Research on hoarding behavior further 
suggests that attachment to objects correlates with a lack of attachment to close others 
(Nedelisky & Steele, 2009). Research on participants diagnosed with OCD with hoarding 
(compared to those with non-hoarding OCD) showed that hoarders have systematically higher 
emotional involvement and attachment to objects as well as less emotional involvement in close 
others. 
  But this correlational work cannot tell us which came first: are people using objects to 
find security when others are not providing enough security, or does the use of objects for 
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security drive close others away? While the attachment system is designed to find security 
through close others, I predict that people may redirect this system to inanimate targets when 
their efforts at human attachment are insufficient to meet their security needs. Much like infants 
derive a form of security from transitional objects, adults may turn to objects as a means of 
establishing security when others disappoint them or are not as reliable as expected. 
Study 1 
 The first study was designed to directly test the extent to which people’s attachment to 
objects is increased by the salience of close others’ unreliability To test this hypothesis, we 
randomly assigned participants to write about situations in which others were reliably helpful or 
unreliable. Inclusion of a condition priming the reliability of close others allowed me to test 
whether the hypothesized effect is specific to thoughts of close others being unreliable, as I 
expect, and not simply the result of thinking about close others. We also manipulated whe her the 
targets of the prime were close or distant others (i.e., strangers) to ensure that the hypothesized 
effect is not due to thinking about anyone being unreliable, but specifically close others. If my 
hypothesis is correct, then people should be attracted to attachment relations with objec s only 
when they are reminded that their relations with close others (but not strangers) are a sometimes 
unreliable source of security, as this is the only condition that specifically threatens the extent to 
which a participants’ attachment relations can provide sufficient security. Th s manipulation was 
developed following Winnicott: I believe that it is the (un)reliability of close others that 
determines whether or not people are motivated to find security through objects.  
Method 
 A community sample of 99 participants, recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk service, participated for a minimal financial incentive ($.40). All participants completed the 
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study materials through Qualtrics, a web service for conducting online data collection. The 
survey began with general demographic items and filler questionnaires, the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the Personal Need for Structure Scale (Thompson, 
Naccarato, & Parker, 1989; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), designed to bolster the cover story that 
we were studying the relationships between personality and people’s experiences. 
Relationship Uncertainty Manipulation 
 Ostensibly as part of the study of people’s experiences, participants were then asked to 
complete a written task comprising a manipulation of relationship uncertainty. Par icipants were 
instructed that their responses to the written task would be content analyzed to reveal dimensions 
about their personality, and they were encouraged to respond honestly and with as muc detail as 
they felt comfortable sharing. Participants were randomly assigned to one offour prompts in a 2 
(Close v. Distant Others) x 2 (Reliable v. Unreliable) design. The prompts for the conditions 
were designed to encourage participants to think about close or unknown others either providing 
or failing to provide assistance during a time of need: 
 Close Others Reliable 
 Sometimes people who are close to us are there for us when we need them the most. For 
 example, perhaps recently you were stressed out and a close friend helped you feel better. 
 Or perhaps over the past couple months one of your parents or siblings gave you very 
 helpful advice about a personal problem.  
 
 Think of THREE recent times when someone close to you was there for you in a time of
 need. In each space below, write a couple sentences about what happened and how it 
 made you feel at the time. Your personal, honest responses are appreciated, and will 
 remain confidential. 
 
 Close Others Unreliable 
 Sometimes people who are close to us “let us down.” In other words, they are not there 
 for us when we need them the most. For example, perhaps recently you were stressed out 
 and a close friend failed to give you any support. Or perhaps over the past couple m nths 
 one of your parents or siblings wasn’t there when you really needed advice about a
 personal problem. 
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 Think of THREE recent times when someone close to you let you down in a time of need. 
 In the space below, write a couple sentences about what happened during ONE of those 
 times and how it made you feel. Press enter when you are finished. Your personal, honest 
 responses are appreciated, and will remain confidential. 
 
 Distant Others Reliable 
 Sometimes strangers are there for us when we need them the most. For example, perhaps 
 recently you asked a stranger for directions and they helped you. Or perhaps over the past 
 couple months a nurse called in a prescription for you, or a store clerk helped you when 
 you needed assistance. 
 
 Think of THREE recent times when a stranger was there for you in a time of need. I  the 
 space below, write a couple sentences about what happened during ONE of those times 
 and how it made you feel. Press enter when you are finished. Your personal, honest 
 responses are appreciated, and will remain confidential. 
 
 Distant Others Unreliable 
 Sometimes strangers "let us down."  In other words, they are not there for us when we 
 need them the most. For example, perhaps recently you asked a stranger for dir cti ns 
 and they rudely ignored you. Or perhaps over the past couple months a nurse forgot to 
 call in a prescription for you, or a store clerk was rude to you when you needed 
 assistance. 
 
 Think of THREE recent times when a stranger let you down in a time of need. In the 
 space below, write a couple sentences about what happened during ONE of those times 
 and how it made you feel. Press enter when you are finished. Your personal, honest 
 responses are appreciated, and will remain confidential. 
 
After each prompt, participants were provided with three boxes on the website in which to 
describe their experiences.  
Attachment to Objects  
 Attachment to objects, our primary dependent variable, was assessed using Nedelisky & 
Steele’s (2009) measure of attachment to objects. This measure is a modificati n of the 
Reciprocal Attachment Questionnaire (RAQ; West, Sheldon, & Reiffer, 1987; West & Sheldon-
Keller, 1992), a measure of attachment relationships that assesses several components of the 
attachment relation.  Nedelisky & Steele’s (2009) measure of attachment to objects, referred to as 
the RAQ-A, substitutes “belongings” for the human attachment figure referred to in RAQ items. 
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This was used because, as far as I know, it is one of the only self-report measures of attachment 
to objects in the literature. 
 The RAQ-A contains 9 separate dimensions. One is intended to be a single, face valid 
item that measures the extent to which objects fulfill an attachment role for the participant: “I 
turn to my belongings for many things, including comfort and reassurance.” The remaining 8 
subscales are split into two groups: 1) features of the attachment relationship; a d 2) appraisal of 
the attachment relationship. 
 Four subscales measure the degree to which certain features of an attachment relatio ship 
are present. The first uses 5 items to assess the extent to which people fear th  loss of their 
possessions (Feared Loss, e.g.” I worry about losing my belongings”). The second dimension (4 
items) measures the degree to which people are motivated to maintain proximity with their 
belongings when they feel threatened (Proximity Seeking, e.g. “When I am anxious I desperately 
need to be close to my belongings”). The third dimension (4 items) measures the extent to which 
possessions serve to provide persistent reassurance (Secure Base, e.g. “I feel much more insecure 
or vulnerable when I am away from my belongings”). The fourth attachment relationship 
dimension (4 items) measures the extent to which people protest or are made anxious by 
separation from their belongings (Separation Protest, e.g. “I feel vulnerable when I am away 
from my belongings for a few days”). Two of these dimensions were highly reliable, Proximity 
Seeking, α = .88 and Secure Base, α = .92, while the others were only somewhat reliable, Feared 
Loss, α = .74, and Separation Protest, α = .76. 
 The remaining subscales are designed primarily to assess the ways in which people 
construe their attachment relation with objects. The first dimension (1 item) m asures anger 
about attachment to objects (Angry Withdrawal; “I get really angry at myself because I think 
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taking care of my belongings takes up too much time”). The second dimension (8 items) 
measures participants’ motivation to reciprocate care towards their possessi n  (Compulsive 
Care-Giving, e.g. “It makes me feel better when I spend time taking care of my belongings.”). 
The third dimension (9 items) measures people’s dependence on their attachment to objects 
(Compulsive Care-Seeking, e.g. “I would be helpless without my belongings”). A further 
subscale (3 items) was intended to measure people’s motivations to be self-reliant (Compulsive 
Self-Reliance, e.g. “I feel it is best not to depend on my belongings”). Reliabilities for these care-
giving and –seeking scales were sufficient: Compulsive Care-Giving, α = .79, Compulsive Care-
Seeking, α = .79. However, the Compulsive Self-Reliance scale was lacking reliability, α = 68.  
 Given the poor reliability of many subscales in the RAQ-A, and the weaknesses of a 
single-item measure of attachment to objects, we averaged across the scales a  a better measure 
of people’s overall attachment to objects. Reverse-scoring compulsive self-rliance (which 
indicates rejection of the attachment relationship) and considering the remaining subscales 
provides a much more reliable measure of people’s attachment to objects, α = 91. Participants 
mean scores on this were used as a measure of their overall attachment to objects. 
Results 
 Participants’ scores on the Attachment to Objects measure were submitted to a 2 (Close v. 
Distant Others) x 2 (Reliable v. Unreliable) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). We 
observed a significant main effect of closeness, F (1, 95) = 4.79, p = .03, η2 = .05. However, this 
was qualified by a significant Closeness x Reliability interaction, F (1, 95) = 4.42, p = .04, η2 = 
.05 (for the pattern of means, see Figure 1).  
 Pairwise comparisons (using Fisher’s LSD) revealed that participants rimed with 
unreliable close relationships scored higher on object attachment (M = 3.16, SD = .94) than 
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participants primed with reliable close relationships (M = 2.66, SD = .90), p = .046. Also 
supporting hypotheses, participants primed with unreliable close relationships reported being 
more attached to objects than both those primed with reliable distant others (M = 2.65, SD = .90), 
p = .045, as well as those primed with unreliable distant others (M = 2.41, SD = .92), p = .002. 
No other pairwise comparison reached significance, ps > .30  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 show that people do in fact increase in their motivation to attach to 
objects when threatened with the unreliability of close others. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
participants increased in their attachment to objects as a way of compensating for a lack of 
reliable security from close others, while no differences were observed between he remaining 
conditions. These data support the claim that the effects of this unreliability prime are specific to 
close others, and are not the result of merely any uncertainty about other people, as evidenced by 
the comparison between the close and distant unreliable conditions. Moreover, simply thinking 
of close others did not increase (or decrease) attachment to objects, as we see a significant 
difference between the close others reliable and unreliable conditions. 
 It is also important to recognize that the pattern of means observed in the two close thers 
conditions is not the result of decreased attachment to objects when primed with a reminde  that 
close others are reliable. There were no significant differences between the close others reliable 
condition and the two distant others conditions. While we might think that participants might 
detach from objects when reminded of the reliability of close others, we see this pattern of results 
was not supported.  
 Although the results of Study 1 support our broad claims about the psychological 
function of object attachment, they do not directly assess the mechanism proposed to underlie 
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these effects. Specifically, our guiding analysis suggests that contempla ing the unreliability of 
close others will cause a threat to one’s sense of security, which will then predict increased object 
attachment. Study 2 directly assesses this hypothesis.  
Study 2 
 While Study 1 provides an important first step in supporting the hypothesis that 
attachment to objects is a defensive reaction designed to cope with insufficient seurity from 
close others, we must importantly test the mechanism underlying this strategy. Following 
Nedelisky & Steele’s (2009) insight that decreased attachment to others is co related with 
increased attachment to objects in a clinical sample, we should expect that there will be 
important relationships in a non-clinical sample between attachment to close others and 
attachment to objects. Given that people show increased attachment to objects when threat ed 
with uncertainties about their close relationships (Study 1), Study 2 was designed to explore the 
extent to which peoples’ attachment relations to close others might predict their at achment to 
objects.  
We believe that attachment anxiety is the mediating variable underlying the effect 
observed in Study 1. Specifically, we predict that as people are increasingly co cerned about 
abandonment and rejection, they will turn to objects as a source of attachment. To confirm this 
assumption, we conducted a pilot study in which 50 undergraduate participants completed the 
39-item RAQ-A4 used in Study 1 and the Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised scale 
(ECR-R; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000), which, as described more fully below, consists of 18 
items assessing attachment anxiety (α = .93) and 18 items assessing attachment avoidance (α = 
.96). Participants’ scores on the measure of attachment to objects were submitted to simple 
regression analyses to test the extent to which their scores might be predicted by individual 
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differences in interpersonal attachment. As predicted, attachment anxiety was significantly and 
positively associated with object attachment (β = .22, SE = .08, t = 2.65, p = .01, whereas 
attachment avoidance was not (β = .06, t = .76, p = .45).  
This pilot study supported our assumption that attachment anxiety, but not attachment 
avoidance would predict object attachment. Thus, in the full study we tested the mediational 
hypothesis that the salience of close others’ unreliability will increase attachment anxiety, which 
will in turn increase object attachment. This suggests that people who are increas gly anxious 
about abandonment or isolation are attracted to the use of objects for attachment relatio s, 
presumably because objects lack the capacity (specifically the agency) to abandon the individual. 
One feature of objects that makes them attractive sources of security, as noted by theorizing on 
transitional objects, is the fact that they are reliable and controllable.  
 Study 2 also builds on the previous studies by invoking a stronger comparison condition. 
In Study 1, the distant others unreliable prime may not actually prove all that thre ening to 
participants since many people may not, in fact, expect strangers to be particularly helpful in the 
first place. In this study we attempted to use a comparison to a condition that was directly self-
relevant. Moreover, because attachment anxiety is typically understood as a negative working 
model of the self (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991), a control condition that directly threatens 
participants with a negative view of their own capabilities provides a more compelling 
comparison for the specific effect of attachment anxiety on object attachment in the close others 
unreliable condition.  
Method 
 A community sample of 48 participants, recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk service participated for a minimal financial incentive ($.25). As in Study 1, all participants 
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completed the study materials through Qualtrics. The materials again begwith general 
demographic items and filler questionnaires (again self-esteem and Need for Structure) designed 
to bolster the cover story that we were studying the relationships between perso ality and 
people’s experiences. 
Relationship Uncertainty Manipulation 
 Again using the cover story from Study 1, a study of personality and people’s 
experiences, participants were again asked to complete a written task comprising a manipulation 
of relationship uncertainty. They were again instructed that their responses to the written task 
would be content analyzed to reveal dimensions about their personality, and they were 
encouraged to respond honestly and with as much detail as they felt comfortable sharing.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Half of the participan s were 
provided with the Close Others Unreliable prime from Study 1, while the rest recived a Self 
Unreliable prime: 
 Self Unreliable 
 Sometimes we “let ourselves down.” In other words, we fail to do something that we 
 need to do for  ourselves. For example, perhaps recently you promised yourself that you 
 would stop stressing out about something, but you kept  stressing out. Or perhaps over 
 the past couple months you failed to solve a personal problem that you told yourself you 
 would solve.  
  
 Think of THREE recent times when you let yourself down in a time of need. In each 
 space below, write a couple sentences about what happened and how it made you feel at 
 the time. Your personal, honest responses are appreciated, and will remain confidential. 
 
This comparison is not only more impactful, but also more effectively controls for negative 
affect and personal relevance than the distant others unreliable prime used in Study 1.  
Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised  
 Participants then completed the Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised scale (ECR-
R; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). The ECR-R measures two key dimensions of attachment 
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style. Of the 36 items, half measure participants’ degree of attachment avoidance, i.e. the extent 
to which participants resist attachment to others (“I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner 
wants to be very close,” “I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners (reversed)”).  The 
remaining 18 items of the ECR-R assess participants’ attachment anxiety, i.e. the extent to which 
they fear abandonment or insufficient love (“My desire to be very close sometimes scares people 
away,” “When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become interested in 
someone else.”). This scale was used because the reliability and validity of this scale are well 
established (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley, Fischer, & Liu, 2005). As an important note, h wever, 
this is a trait measure of attachment style, thus any change by condition is . In our sample, 
responses to the two subscales showed good reliability (αavoidance = .97; αanxiety = .93). 
Attachment to Objects  
 Attachment to objects was then assessed using the RAQ-A. Once again, the scales 
showed a range of both acceptable and dubious reliabilities. Two dimensions were highly 
reliable, Proximity Seeking, α = .92 and Secure Base, α = .90. Other scales were only somewhat 
reliable, including Feared Loss, α = .75, Separation Protest, α = .76, Compulsive Care-Giving, α 
= .73, Compulsive Care-Seeking, α = .80. Once again the Compulsive Self-Reliance scale was 
lacking reliability, α = 63. Scores on the subscales were once again averaged to provide a better 
measure of people’s overall attachment to objects, α = 92.  
Results 
 Initial tests were conducted to assess the effects of priming condition on attachment 
anxiety, attachment avoidance, and object attachment (see Figure 2 for a depiction of the relevant 
means). Following predictions, attachment anxiety was significantly higher w en participants 
were primed with unreliable close others (M = 3.58, SD = 1.06) than with personal unreliability 
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(M = 2.80, SD = 1.11), F(1, 46) = 6.04, p = .02, η2 = .12. Attachment avoidance was also 
significantly higher when participants were primed with the unreliability of close others (M = 
3.52, SD = 1.52) than themselves (M = 2.70, SD = 1.10), F(1, 46) = 4.54, p = .04, η2 = .09. 
Critically, we also found that attachment to objects was significantly higher in close others 
unreliable condition (M = 3.17, SD = .94) than the self unreliable condition (M = 2.51, SD = .70), 
F(1, 46) = 6.53, p = .01, η2 = .14.  
 To test the hypothesis that attachment anxiety mediates the effect of priming condition on 
object attachment, we first tested whether or not attachment anxiety predicted attachment to 
objects and found that it was in fact a significant predictor, β = .33, SE = .10, t = 3.17, p = .003, 
R2 = .18. We tested the predicted model in which the effect of the prime on attachment to objects 
is mediated by attachment anxiety (Figure 3). Using Preacher & Hayes Bootstrapping procedure 
(2008) and a bootstrap of 5000 samples, the mediation model was found to have a confidence 
interval ranging from (.02, .50).  Because this confidence interval does not contain zero, we can 
be confident at α = .05 that the effect of the close others unreliable prime on object attachment is 
mediated by an increase in attachment anxiety.  
 Finally, to test the specificity of this proposed model, another mediational analysis was 
conducted using attachment avoidance in place of attachment anxiety. Unlike the sampl  in the 
pilot study, in these data attachment avoidance was found to be a significant predictor of 
attachment to objects, β = .26, SE = .09, t = 3.02, p = .004, R2 = .17. However, the mediational 
analysis, again with a bootstrap of 5000 samples, results in a confidence interval from (-.02, .45). 
Because this interval includes 0, we must reject the hypothesis that the effect of the close others 
unreliable prime on object attachment is mediated by an increase in attachment avoidance5. 
Discussion 
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 The results of Study 2 provide a substantive explanation for the results observed in Study 
1. We observed in the first study that when participants were primed with thoughts that close 
others are unreliable, they increased in their attachments to objects relative to all comparison 
conditions. The question we were left with was simple: why? In the pilot study of Study 2, we 
observed that attachment anxiety significantly predicted object attachment, whereas attachment 
avoidance did not. Study 2 provides further support for both sets of findings by offering a causal 
model for explaining the effects of Study 1: the effect of priming the unreliability of close others 
increases attachment to objects by increasing attachment anxiety, but notthrough an increase in 
attachment avoidance.   
 Initial comparisons between the two conditions in Study 2 showed that the close others 
unreliable prime was increasing both dimensions of attachment measured in the ECR-R as well 
as object attachment. When participants think about how unreliable close others can be, they 
become simultaneously more concerned about abandonment (attachment anxiety) as w ll as 
more detached from those relations (attachment avoidance). Moreover, we observe that they 
become more motivated to find security in their belongings. 
 But what is the mechanism that leads people to have attachment relations wih objects? I 
have argued that the fundamental motivation behind this attachment strategy is an attempt to find 
attachment figures that are reliable and controllable in a way that close others sometimes are not, 
as a way of compensating for a lack of sufficient interpersonal attachment. Th  mediational 
analyses in Study 2 provide strong support for this hypothesis by directly testing the extent to 
which concerns about rejection and abandonment mediate the effects of the close others 
unreliable prime on attachment to objects. When we are reminded of how close others can and do 
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abandon us, we become more anxious in our attachment, and thus more motivated to seek out 
attachment figures that can provide the security that we fear close others will not.  
General Discussion 
 The primary goal of this paper was to explore the motivations behind the use of objectsas 
attachment figures. Prior research in consumer psychology, sociology, psychoanalysis, and 
clinical psychology has supported the claim that people do in fact find security in their 
possessions, and some of this research has even begun to offer potential explanations for the 
phenomenon. The goal of these studies was to test one specific explanation from Winnicott’s 
transitional objects theory: that people are motivated to find security through objects when close 
others fail to serve as sufficiently reliable sources of security.  
 In Study 1, this hypothesis was tested directly by manipulating whether participants were 
primed with reminders of ways in which close (or distant) others were unreliable (or reliable). 
Notably this prime only increased attachment to objects in the close others unreliable condition. 
Merely thinking of close relationships does not increase people’s attachment to objects, as 
evidenced by the comparison between the close others reliable and close others unreliable 
conditions. Moreover, not all threats about the unreliability of others drive us to attach to objects, 
as shown by the comparison between the close v. distant others unreliable conditions.  
 Study 2 tests the extent to which attachment anxiety serves as the key causal mechanism 
underlying the relationship between the threat of unreliable close others and the observed 
increase in attachment to objects. Through the mediational analyses, we found that only 
attachment anxiety, and not attachment avoidance, significantly mediated the effect of the prime 
on attachment to objects.  
Limitations 
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 A potential limitation to these studies is the measure of object attachment. Th  RAQ-A 
that Nedelsky & Steele (2009) developed contains a number of subscales measuring features of 
the attachment relation between people and their belongings. Unfortunately this scale substitutes 
“belongings” into the RAQ-A, which is problematically general. Attachment r lations are much 
narrower than this. We cannot know which objects people have in mind when completing the 
scale, or even if they are thinking of a specific attachment relation to an object. Th  subscales of 
the RAQ-A also consistently showed poor reliabilities. While the composite f these subscales 
provided a reliable measure of attachment to objects in these studies, this unintended us of this 
scale may not be the most straightforward measure of attachment to objects. A bet er self-report 
measure, as well as more subtle indices (e.g. behavioral) of attachment to objec s, would greatly 
strengthen the results of these studies. 
 A further concern with these studies is the fact that all data were collected using a 
computer. While this would be a non-issue for the vast majority of psychological rese rch, it may 
serve to influence how people think about their belongings in the studies. Given the relative
centrality of computer use in our everyday work and leisure, computers offer a salient example 
of an object that is particularly useful. As a result, it may be that this may be the most salient 
object people have in mind when completing the attachment to objects measure. This does not 
necessarily undermine the findings, though it does suggest that potentially the effect of the prime 
is narrower than it has been interpreted. 
Future Research   
 These studies suggest a number of avenues for future research. Future studies might 
consider the importance of other outcomes in the object attachment process. If attachment to 
objects is fulfilling fundamentally the same purposes as attachment to close others, we should 
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expect that situational and dispositional attachment to objects might predict greater feelings of 
security and efficacy, as well as reducing perceived threat in the environment.   
 Moreover, and following Study 2, we might expect that increased attachment to objects 
could serve to reduce future feelings of attachment anxiety and potentially avoidance. If 
attachment to objects gives us a new source of psychological security, we may use this new 
secure base as a foundation for taking the risk of trusting close others again. Most of us are not 
continually threatened by the unreliability of close others, so some work should be done on the 
ways in which attachment to objects allows us to re-establish trust in close others. For example, 
we might consider the importance of a longitudinal study of the ways in which attament to 
objects might rise in response to threat, but ultimately serve to protect relationships over time.  
 Furthermore, work can and should be done in developing the construct of attachment to 
objects. The RAQ-A used in this study is designed specifically to measure ttachment to objects 
as a parallel to attachment to other subjects (by replacing subject words with “belongings” in the 
RAQ), but this may be inappropriate. For example, does object attachment represent th  same 
two dimensions as attachment to subjects, i.e. object attachment avoidance and anxiety? Are 
there object attachment styles? Are there other important (and orthogonal) dimensions to our 
attachments to objects, such as features of the objects that should be considered?  
 The specificity of attachment relations to objects is also an open question. In attachment 
with a spouse or a caregiver, the attachment relation is quite specific. However, as noted, over 
the course of development, people also learn to strategically use a variety of friends to fulfill 
specific attachment functions. Is it the case that people attach to a particular object? Do they 
have different objects for different attachment roles, e.g. a car that servesas a secure base and a 
blanket that serves to console one after distress?  
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 On this note, research should consider the specific features of objects that make them 
more or less attractive as attachment figures. For example, one might consider the effects of 
anthropomorphism in changing how people attach to objects. Objects that are more subject-like 
should be attractive to those who are seeking a subject as an attachment figure, while the same 
subjectivity might be threatening to someone who is temporarily anxious about others. 
 In this thesis, it was assumed, following Winnicott, that the reliability of objects makes 
them attractive but clearly there are many other important differences between subjects and 
objects that might make them attractive sources of psychological security. Rel ability in this 
sense is the result of a cluster of features: objects lack agency, they respond to the individual, 
they are controllable, etc. Some of these features may be more important than o hers, even within 
the reliability construct. Other features outside this construct should be explored to determine 
which features of objects lead people to find security through them. 
 Finally, this thesis has only considered attachment to objects as a compensatory str teg . 
Research on attachment in religion has suggested another path that leads people to find secur ty 
through a divine figure: namely correspondence (Kirkpatrick, 2005; Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 
2008). Some evidence has been found that people with secure interpersonal attachments also 
show a secure attachment to a god, suggesting that attachment to god (for securely attached 
individuals) often mirrors their attachment to an attachment figure.  
 Is it possible that a similar process might play a role in object attachment? That is, is it 
possible that people might attach to objects as they do close others? This suggests a radically 
different pattern of attachment than that which has been shown in this thesis, but it remains an 
open possibility. Given the extent to which our objects are infused with social significance 
(Miller, 2008), it may be that a subject’s attachment to a close other leads to diffuse attachment 
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relations with things associated with the attachment figure. If, for example, one finds comfort 
from a loved one, an article of the loved one’s clothing (e.g. a jacket) might provide security as a 
marker of the attachment figure. Further research should be conducted on this pattern of 
attachment to objects.  
Conclusions 
 At no point in this thesis has any effort been made to problematize attachment to objec s, 
and this is wholly deliberate. Following Winnicott (1953/1986), it is important to remember that 
our ability to find security through objects is an early addition to our psychological toolkit, and 
one that is not intrinsically pathological. While instances like hoarding may represent extreme 
cases, work on transitional objects and consumerism suggests that our attachments to objects are 
an inevitable aspect of life in consumer culture. The strategic use of objects to fulfill security 
needs is so inherently human that children spontaneously acquire the skill, and adults apply i  as 
well, albeit with more complex motivations and more resources. 
 We as subjects will often be threatened with the unreliability of a close other, and our 
ability to find new sources of psychological security should be seen, in general, as a marker of 
the creative ways that people protect themselves. Certainly the person whose only ource of 
security is a collection of stamps or a particular cell phone might represent cas s in which the 
costs outweigh the benefits. For most of us, however, the ability to temporarily find comfort in 
reliable computers, books, cars, etc. provides a benefit that we cannot find through other 
subjects. As much as we may invest in close others, objects still fulfill a unique and important 
role that supplements, but need not preclude, our relationships with close others. 
 But of course, the recognition of this usefulness must be taken with a considerable grain 
of salt. We might worry about the extent to which people’s needs for security might be used to 
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exploit consumers by appealing to this core psychological motive. As we value objects that can 
afford us psychological security in the face of unreliable support from close others, consumers 
will be attracted to commodities that can ensure comfort and security in a reliable manner, 
particularly in contexts in which the unreliability of close others is particularly salient. The 
marketing of products such as cell phones (e.g. ads that promote the reliability of service or the 
responsiveness of a network) may exploit people’s basic need for reliability in a context in which 
the reliability of a close other may be called into question. We never know quite how a friend or 
family member may receive a phone call or a text, and this intrinsic uncertainty may attract 
people to commodities.   
 Finally, as people in Western settings find themselves increasingly mobile (Schug et al., 
2009; Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010), maintaining stable and reliable relationships is 
increasingly difficult in contemporary society. The highly mobile context of relationships makes 
them increasingly uncertain, e.g. by increasing the possibilities that a friend or family member 
may move away or increasing the chances that a close others may be too far away to be a reliable 
source of security. In this context, attachment to objects may become, for some, m re than just a 
strategy for temporarily compensating for insufficient reliability n human attachment because 
this reliability is so much harder to find.  
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Figure 1: Attachment to Objects by Condition in Study 1 
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Figure 2: Differences in Attachment by Condition in Study 2   
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Obj. Attachment 
Attachment Anx. 
Prime Condition 
Close Others Unreliable: 1  
Self Unreliable : 0   
 
β = .78* β = .33** 
Total Effect (c): β = .66** 
Direct Effect (c’): β = .46, n.s. 
 
Note. The direct effect coefficient represents the effect of the independent 
 variable after controlling for the effect of the proposed mediator. 
 
Total adjusted R
2
 for the model = .24, F(2, 44) = 7.11, p < .01 
 * Significant at p < .05 
 ** Significant at p < .01 
 
Figure 3: Mediation of the Effect of Relationship Uncertainty on Object Attachment by Anxiety 
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1
 There are other ways of classifying the distinguishing features of an attachment relation. For example, Zeifman & 
Hazan, 2008 suggest four criteria: 1) Proximity maintenance, 2) Separation distress, 3) Safe Haven, and 4) Secure 
Base. The first two of these are among Ainsworth’s criteria, and the latter two fall, roughly, under criterion 6: that 
the individual is a source of temporary (i.e. when faced with threat) and dispositional security. Ainsworth’s criteria 
were selected for the purposes of this paper becaus they are general enough to be somewhat all-inclusive of other 
definitions, and because her considerations of attachment are foundational to contemporary research. 
 
2 Winnicott’s transitional object theory is a valuable supplement to attachment theory. Transitional phenomena need 
not entail the denial of attachment relations with a caregiver, but merely suggest that children use obj cts to find a 
degree of autonomy by providing some psychological security for themselves. We rely on attachment figures for the 
security needs we are incapable of fulfilling ourselves, and a fully developed attachment theory consider  the 
relative autonomy of the subject in determining attachment style. For example, anxiously attached indiv duals are 
often characterized by their over-dependence on others for security (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). A failure to 
use objects to self-soothe may contribute, ultimately, o over-reliance on close others for security needs. 
 
3 This raises the interesting problem of the relationship between attachment and transitional object phenomena. 
Some see transitional objects as a temporary defensive replacement for poor interpersonal attachment or for poor 
parental bonding (Bachar et al., 1998; Erkolahti & Nyström, 2007). There is certainly a sense in which a transitional 
object relationship bears a number of important features of attachment relations, such as being particular and being a 
source of psychological security. In other respects, however, the relationships are quite different: e.g., transitional 
object relationships are always presumed to be temporary (Winnicott, 1953/1986). The goal of this project is to 
specifically look at attachment to objects, defined arrowly as a relationship to objects that is modele  on 
attachment relations to subjects. The important question of how distinct this is from transitional object use is 
noteworthy, but can be set aside for the purposes of this project. 
 
4
 Subscale reliabilities on the RAQ-A ranged considerably. Proximity Seeking was very reliable, α = .90, as was 
Secure Base, α = .82. Separation Protest (α = .75), Compulsive Care-Seeking (α = .72), and Compulsive Care-
Giving (α = .69) were lacking in reliability. Feared Loss (α = .63) and Compulsive Self-Reliance (α = .34) were 
particularly problematic.  
 Given the wide range of reliabilities within the sub cales, a mean of the subscales was once again 
calculated for each participant. This measure of attachment to objects once again proved far more reliabl  than the 
individual subscales, α = .89.  This internal reliability, as in the previous study, was not improved by the removal of 
any subscale and hence all were included in forming a composite measure of attachment to objects. 
 
5
 Testing a model with attachment avoidance and anxiety simultaneously eliminates the effects of both. This is due 
to the high multicollinearity between the two predictors: r = .49, p < .001. The ECR-R is known to inflate the 
correlation between between the two attachment dimensions and hence, this analysis will need to be reconsidered 
using a different measure of attachment.  
